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THE COURTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
JULIUS

G. GETMAN*

INTRODUCTION

The combination of exclusivity and free collective bargaining has
shaped and given special flavor to the American system of industrial
relations. The impact upon labor relations has been a great and positive achievement, casting credit both upon those who designed the system and those who have made it work. Where it has not been defeated
by union indifference or management intransigence, collective bargaining has helped employees to achieve greater power, wealth and dignity.
The widespread use of seniority as a result of collective bargaining and
the almost automatic limitation on the employer's right to discharge
have helped to establish the idea that employees, through their work,
develop a legally enforceable claim to their jobs and that most management decisions affecting significant employee interests must be based
on legitimate objective standards. Through bargained for pensions and
supplemental benefits, employees are provided protection for their old
age and a cushion against unemployment.
Collective bargaining has given American unions a visible, significant presence on the shop floor. It has brought them great resources,
political power and economic leverage. For many employers, this system, while limiting control and raising labor costs, has provided stability in industrial relations. It has reduced quit rates, encouraged the
development of reasonable rules uniformly applied, helped to create a
sense of common enterprise and has thereby often promoted greater
productivity and efficiency.' Through collective bargaining, labor and
management have developed a unique, broadly based private system of
dispute resolution, culminating in arbitration, the success of which has
been widely acknowledged and given impetus to private and public efforts to develop similar systems in different areas throughout society.
Despite this record of achievement and gradual social change, the
*
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1. See generally S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960); C. Brown & J. Medoff, Trade Unions. The Production
Process, 86 J. POL. ECON. 355 (1978).
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judicial attitude toward collective bargaining has increasingly become
one of suspicion and hostility. In the remainder of my comments, I will
briefly discuss some of the cases which reflect this negative attitude and
speculate about its causes. The cases demonstrating the law's diminishing commitment to collective bargaining cover a broad range. They
include opinions broadening management's ability to retaliate against
unionization, reducing the limitations on alternative schemes of industrial relations, eliminating groups of employees from coverage by the
statutes, and limiting the language of § 8(a)(5) concerning the duty to
bargain. I will start with those cases whose relation to CB is most peripheral and conclude with those in which the trend of which I speak is
most apparent.
SECTION 8(A)(2) AND ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA was intended to outlaw company unions which were seen as an effective way of preventing collective bargaining. The language of § 8(a)(2) is very broad, and early Supreme
Court decisions gave it full scope. Thus, the Court in NLRB v. CabotCarbon Co. 2 held that a scheme of employee committees formed to
discuss work related problems as a labor organization and that its formation by the employer constituted a violation. The program was ordered disestablished. The Court's reasoning seemed to rule out any
employer's efforts to deal with his employees through groups, plans,
teams or committees or anything short of collective bargaining with an
independent union freely selected. The Board, for some time thereafter, dutifully followed Cabot-Carbonand literally applied the language
of § 8(a)(2). 3 This rigid scheme was considered justified because of the
need to protect collective bargaining from employer efforts to undermine it by persuading employees that their needs could be served adequately by other forms of employee organization. When the concepts
of worker participation and job enrichment became fashionable, it was
generally thought that their implementation in the U.S. would prove
difficult because of § 8(a)(2) and its previous broad application. In recent years, however, under the pressure of worldwide interest in the
concept of worker participation, the Board and the Courts have developed a series of techniques to reduce the impact of § 8(a)(2). These
2. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
3. See, e.g., Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced, 305
F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1961).
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include a conceptually unpersuasive distinction between improper support and legitimate cooperation 4 and, contrary to Cabot-Carbon, a narrowing of the definition of labor organization. Most recently, in NLRB
v. Scott & Fetzer Co. ,5 the Sixth Circuit upheld a scheme of employee
committees virtually identical with that outlawed in Cabot-Carbon.
I do not suggest that the Board or Courts in deciding these cases
were consciously reducing their support for collective bargaining.
They were rather encouraging experimentation and flexibility on behalf of worker autonomy. Nor am I completely unsympathetic with
these decisions; nevertheless, implicit in them is a conclusion that the
potential gain to employees from such schemes is worth the risk to collective bargaining, an approach which the draftsmen of the statute explicitly rejected. It must be understood that the line between a
company union and an enrichment program may be one of labeling,
and that we have moved fairly quickly from a system in which all experiments with enrichment were condemned as company unions to one
in which company unions are generally accepted in the name of enrichment. These decisions tacitly reject the conclusion, which I believe was
accepted in the drafting of the Wagner Act and early cases, that collective bargaining is the only legitimate form of employee organization.
THE DOCTRINE OF MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES

In several recent cases, the courts have limited the categories of
employees who are entitled to bargaining by developing exemptions for
confidential and managerial employees. 6 Both of these exemptions are
an expression of the courts' concern with divided loyalty which is assumed to be inherent in the process of collective bargaining, not only
for those who might be called upon to bargain in support of management but for those who play a significant role involving the exercise of
discretion in articulating and achieving the organization's goal.
The potential reach of this approach is suggested by the Court's
remarkable opinion in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,7 in which the
Court held that the Yeshiva's faculty were all excluded from the
4. This distinction was originated by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion in Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955) and has since been adopted by a number of
other circuits. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (lst Cir. 1979); Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.
2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
5. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
6. These exclusions were authoritatively enumerated in the Court's opinion in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
7. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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NLRA's coverage as managers. There is no doubt from the Court's
constant generalizing about the role of faculty historically, and at mature institutions like Yeshiva, that it intended its opinion to be broadly
applicable to faculty members at significant educational institutions.
The Labor Board has indeed taken this hint and has ruled that faculty
members at a wide range of institutions are managers and hence not
covered by the Act. 8 Several assumptions concerning collective bargaining are strikingly evident in the Court's Yeshiva opinion: primarily
that it is a system of limited flexibility, appropriate in the industrial
context but not useful where complex relations exist; secondly, that collective bargaining cannot easily coexist with other forms of governance;
thirdly, that collective bargaining inevitabily creates a substantial risk
of disloyalty to the employer not tolerable for those whose tasks are
crucial to the enterprise; and finally, that collective bargaining has little
to offer to those who already collectively possess voice in the enterprise.
The Court in Yeshiva casually totalled the power of all faculty authority, attributing the discretionary responsibility of some to all, a technique with great implications for the future of § 8(a)(2). 9 The Board
has subsequently taken the position that authority obtained through
collective bargaining can make employees managerial and hence exclude them from the Act's coverage.' 0 If this approach is followed in
other areas, it will effect a limit through the concept of managerial employees on what unions may achieve through collective bargaining and
remain under the Act. The assumptions that collective bargaining
means divided loyalty creating unacceptable risk to the employer and
that other forms of employee participation are more appropriate
outside of the industrial context are of potentially enormous applicability, given the trend away from traditional industrial organization and
toward more highly skilled employment. The dangers of disloyalty are
great for many groups in a typical enterprise, not the least of whom are
those who do its basic work. An employer in a new industry who
utilizes the team concept, by which employee groups make basic decisions for themselves about the production process, may now argue with
some chance of success that not only is § 8(a)(2) inapplicable but that
8. See, e.g., Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 84 (1982) (four year, liberal arts college); College of
Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 37 (1982) (medical school faculty); Duquesne
Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B. 85 (1982) (law school faculty).
9. Those implications are quickly beginning to exhibit themselves. For instance, in its recent decision in Florence Volunteer Fire Dept, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 134 (1982), the board relied in
part on Yeshiva in ruling that full-time fire fighters constitute managerial employees, and hence
are excluded from the Act's coverage.
10. College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 37 (1982).
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the team members are all managers outside the scope of the Act, a conclusion made necessary because of the great dangers posed by the possibility of divided loyalty which might result from collective
bargaining.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Collective bargaining may be seen either as a way by which individual workers achieve benefits, job stability and influence, or as a way
in which the union as an institution comes to have power over the individual which may be exercised arbitrarily or malevolently. There is
some aspect of reality to both images, and the courts have recognized
that some combination of these concepts reflects the truest approximation of the impact of collective bargaining on the status of individual
employees. But the statute and earlier precedents are based on the
premise (accurate in my view) that the value of collective bargaining
outweighs the dangers of divergence between the individual and the
union. Recent Court opinions, however, reflect a significant shift in
this balance. One example of this shift is NLRB v. DetroitEdison Co. Ij
The case involved a Labor Board order requiring the employer to turn
over individual test scores of employees to the union which sought this
material in order to process grievances, a recognized aspect of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court refused to uphold the Board's order, holding that impairment of the union interest in processing
grievances was "more than justified by the interests served. . . preserving employee confidence." 1 2 This was the first time the Court had
overridden, in the interests of confidentiality, a Board determination
that information was needed for collective bargaining.
A similar readjustment of values may be seen in the Court's recent
decision in Bowen v. U.S.PostalService,' 3 holding that a union may be
liable for back pay if its breach of the duty of fair representation was
responsible for delaying the reinstatement of an improperly discharged
employee. The decision means that the potential liability of unions
which lose cases may be very great, greater indeed than that of the
employer who committed the improper discharge. To take away funds
from the union reduces its ability to serve its membership through bargaining and grievance handling. The willingness to divert funds which
the union has available for collective bargaining to police the duty of
I1. 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
12. Id. at 319.
13. 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983).
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fair representation reflects both distrust of the union's devotion to the
members' interests, and a diminished sense of the importance and
value of the union's use of the funds.
EMPLOYER RESPONSE TO UNIONIZATION

In a series of cases dealing with the reach of § 8(a)(3)'s prohibition
against retaliation for union activity, the courts have concluded that an
employer's elimination, in advance of bargaining, of that portion of its
operations that had recently been organized is lawful, even though the
action had been taken partly in response to unionization, by concluding
that the closing was not undertaken "to discourage union membership." Thus, in NLRB v. Rapid Binder, Inc. ,14 the court reversed the
Board's finding of a violation when an employer moved his operation
soon after a union was certified without bargaining with it. The court,
although it acknowledged animosity between the employer and union,
stated that there was "no basis for the inference that this was the preponderant motive for the move. . . The decided cases do not condemn
an employer who considers his relationship with his plant's union as
only one part of the broad economic picture. . . ." 15 In a similar case,
the Sixith Circuit commented that "[it is completely unrealistic in the
field of business to say that management is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably in changing its method of operations based on reasonably increased costs."'1 6 What is most interesting about this case is the court's
easy acceptance of the employer's argument that he realistically assumed that collective bargaining would not lead to an acceptable accommodation between him and the union. By characterizing such
motivations as legitimate business judgement, the courts have thereby
rejected the argument that for an employer to assume, in advance of
bargaining, that negotiations would be unreasonable and unproductive,
and to premise actions on that assumption, at the cost of employees,
constitutes the essence of anti-union animosity. The courts, in adopting
this characterization, have assumed that bargaining is inevitably futile
and economically disadvantageous from the employer's perspective.
14. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. Id at 175.
16. NLRB v. J.M. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909
(1961). In more recent cases, the courts have frequently simply relied on "business reasons" as the
rationale for employer's cessation of operations at a recently organized facility and ignored the
role unionization played in the decision to close completely. See, e.g., Weather Tamer Inc. v.
NLRB, 676 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982).

KENNETH M. PIPER LECTURE
LIMITS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPOSED THROUGH THE
DOCTRINE OF MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE BARGAINING

TOPICS
In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,7 the Court adopted the distinction between mandatory and permissive types of bargaining. Permissive topics are those which do not come within the statutory definition
of "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" but
which are otherwise legal for inclusion in an agreement. The proposing side may not insist to impasse upon permissive topics, and the side
within whose domain the matter comes is free to take unilateral action
with respect to it. In Chemical Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Corp.,8 the Supreme Court rejected the Board's conclusion that
changing benefits for retired employees was a mandatory topic. The
Court rested its conclusion on the grounds that retired employees are
not in the bargaining unit and they are not employees for the purposes
of the Act. Although the opinion purported to rest almost entirely on
the plain meaning of the statutory language, the Court's disclaimer of
responsibility for the result reached on the grounds that it was merely
following the manifest of Congress rings hollow. The Court, with no
violence to the statutory language, could have accepted the Board's position that the benefits of retired employees are a matter of significant
and legitimate concern to current employees. In his opinion, Justice
Brennan acknowledged that this approach was previously employed to
hold that a union could bargain about the wages and working- conditions of people to be hired in the future.' 9
The relationship between retirees and current employees might
easily have been considered of vital interest to current employees.
First, the type of pension benefits that is acceptable to existing employees, particularly older ones, might turn on the employees' perception of
the union's willingness and ability to represent and protect them
against unexpected change. Secondly, current workers typically know,
care about, and identify with retirees. They feel that it is the union's
role to continue to look after their interest when they have retired.
Such feelings of continuing allegiance are central to the concept of
worker solidarity, which is the basis of unionism. Justice Brennan,
however, chose to treat the argument based on continuing interest as
though it were an actuarial point about the advantages or disadvan17. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
18. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
19. Id at 168.
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tages of grouping and he dismissed the relationship as "speculative and
insubstantial at best."' 20 Although its language is technical, the Court's
rejection of the Board's position must ultimately rest upon its conclusions, stated mainly in a footnote, that collective bargaining is not a
good method for protecting the rights of retired employees and that
unions cannot be trusted to live up to their rhetoric or their basic
21
ideology.
In First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 22 the Court held that
management had the right to close down part of an enterprise without
bargaining with the union. The Court's opinion has quickly become
the focus of much legal writing, not only because of the importance of
the issue, but because the opinion more openly sets forth the Court's
assumptions about the proper role of unions and the limits of collective
bargaining than any previous opinion. Justice Blackmun rests the
Court's opinion on two interrelated concepts. First, bargaining about
basic entreprenurial decisions would give too much power to unions.
As he stated, "Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union members are employed. . . There is
an undeniable limit to the subjects about which bargaining must take
place 23 . . . in view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking."' 24 Second, the concept that collective bargaining is normally
required over mandatory topics of bargaining because it produces economically efficient results. "The concept of mandatory bargaining is
premised on the belief that collective discussions backed by the parties'
economic weapons will result in decisions that are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole." 25 The Court strongly
suggested that whether management has to bargain over topics related
to its investments or its relations with third parties could be determined
by analyzing "if the benefit for labor-management relations and the
collective-bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business."' 26 The Court therefore undertook, on its own, to
weigh the costs and benefits to determine "if the benefit for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process outweighs the
27
burden placed on the conduct of the business" with respect to costs.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id at 180.
See id. at 173 and n.12.
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
Id at 676.
Id. at 679.
Id at 678.
Id. at 679.
Id
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It considered that little benefit would accrue from requiring collective
bargaining as to the basic decision, as opposed to the effects of the decision, because in those situations in which management did not voluntarily choose to bargain about its decision "[i]t is unlikely, however, that
requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well as its effects, will
augment this flow of information and suggestions." 28 The Court further concluded that to require bargaining would "afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart
management's intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution.' ' 29 All of these cases taken together represent an effort to limit
collective bargaining to traditional areas and subjects, as well as an
effort to protect the perceived interests of employers, employees and
retirees from its dangers.
How can we explain the paradox of a successful system viewed
with increasing suspicion and even hostility by the courts? We must
start with the recognition that the problems dealt with, as well as the
techniques and methods of collective bargaining, are all foreign to the
experience of most judges. They have little personal knowledge of industrial relations to fall back on. It is the reflection of collective bargaining derived from cases, scholarly writings and media depictions
which furnish the court's conception of the process. There are a variety
of reasons why all of these are currently portraying a distorted sense of
collective bargaining. When the system works well, there is no need or
purpose for legal action. Indeed, one of the goals of collective bargaining is that it should take place largely unsupervised by the government
and outside of the courts. Cases are likely to arise when three factors
are present: when collective bargaining does not work well, when the
law is uncertain and when it provides the possibility of a significant
remedy. Thus, one might expect that currently the duty of fair representation cases will be a much higher percentage of the Court's labor
business than questions arising out of the arbitration or bargaining
processes, just as misuse of pensions, plant closings, violence and corruption are all likely to provide more than their fair share of litigation.
Reporters and newscasters, too, are trained to focus on the newsworthy,
which usually means disruptions, conflicts, betrayal and calamity.
Scholarly studies and analyses offer the best hope of providing a balanced picture which will correct the inevitable misconceptions derived
from cases and media, and there is much valuable information about
28. Id at 681.
29. Id at 683.
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collective bargaining to be derived from scholarly journals, particularly
in the area of industrial relations. But these are rarely looked to. The
Court in Yeshiva, for example, did not seem to be aware of studies of
professional unions which indicate that their impact on employee work
behavior is minimal. The behavior of professional employees, according to such studies, is primarily shaped by professional standards 30 and
it is by consistency with their professional commitment that such employees best serve the employer.
The Court has often looked to legal scholarship but such work has
not always been noteworthy, for legal scholarship has its own biases,
fashions and temptations, many of which are currently unfavorable to
collective bargaining. This is a particularly poor time to expect legal
scholarship to correct the Court's misperceptions. The current emphasis is on theory, elegance, paradigms and mathematical models. Behind these sophisticated paraphernalia the face of human labor is often
hidden and ignored. Collective bargaining has been evaluated in terms
of its conformity with the postulates of economic analysis and critical
legal thinking and it has been found wanting by both; by one as a distortion of the market, by the other because it appears as a misleading
image of social change.
The law and economics movements may yet provide valuable insights about labor law. Thus far, the writing has been simplistic, evaluating existing institutions from the perspective of laissezfaire analysis,
making the same arguments which the opponents of the Wagner Act
made and which the framers of most modem labor legislation rejected.
Thus, Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago, in evaluating the New Deal labor legislation, 3 1 attacks both the Norris-Laguardia and the National Labor Relations Acts on the grounds that they
interfere with freedom of contract and free use of property. The same
method of analysis was also employed by the UCLA Law Review
which concluded, in a note cited by the Supreme Court in First National Maintenance,32 that bargaining about plant closings was ineffi33
cient and deprived the employer of the free use of his property.
In the name of individual rights, worker solidarity and class con30. See, e.g., A. KORNHAUSER, SCIENTISTS IN INDUSTRY, (1963); M. HAUG & M. SUSSMAN,
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND UNIONISM IN THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS (E. Friedson,

ed. 1973).
31. Epstein, A Common Lawfor Labor Relations. A Critiqueof the New Deal Labor Legislation, - YALE L.J. - (1983).

32. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
33. Comment, "PartialTerminations"--.A Choice Between BargainingEquality and Economic
Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1089 (1967).
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sciousness, collective bargaining, exclusivity and labor arbitration
have all been attacked from the left by critical legal thinkers on the
ground that they diminish radicalization, class consciousness, worker
militancy and provide employees only with limited power. There is
about these writings a strong although unconscious class bias. They
reflect annoyance with the labor movement for its lack of political ideology and a consequent denial of its achievements. The reflections of
the public and scholarly images of collective bargaining are everywhere
in the cases. Thus, the Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision may be most
understandable as a response to well publicized instances of misuse of
pension funds by the Teamsters. The Bowen and Detroit Edison cases
show deep suspicion about unions as political institutions, and Yeshiva
reflects an idealized image of universities and a stereotyped view of
unions.
CONCLUSION

Fortunately, the power of labor and its ability to represent its
members is not easily affected by changes in the law. First National
Maintenance, PittsburghPlate Glass and the § 8(a)(2) cases are all, for
different reasons, unlikely to be very significant, but Yeshiva and the
duty of fair representation cases represent serious although not fatal
blows to the development of collective bargaining. Unless legal scholarship becomes more accurate and connected with the realities of labor
relations, one may expect the Court's current anti-labor, anti-collective
bargaining positions to harden and expand, thereby furthering the distrust workers often feel toward intellectuals, lawyers and courts and
diminishing the capacity of organized labor to serve its members.

